Selling two identical objects
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Publication:2123177
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105397zbMath1484.91209arXiv2009.11545OpenAlexW4206100288MaRDI QIDQ2123177
Debasis Mishra, Sushil Bikhchandani
Publication date: 8 April 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2009.11545
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Cites Work
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