Bayesian social aggregation with accumulating evidence
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Publication:2123179
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105399zbMath1484.91175OpenAlexW4206001563MaRDI QIDQ2123179
Publication date: 8 April 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105399
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