Correlation-robust auction design

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105403zbMath1484.91215OpenAlexW4205182749MaRDI QIDQ2123186

Wei He, Jiangtao Li

Publication date: 8 April 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2409

zbMATH Keywords

correlationoptimal transportrobust mechanism designsecond-price auctionduality approachlow reserve price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items

Distributionally robust pricing in independent private value auctions

Cites Work

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