When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?
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Publication:2125094
DOI10.1007/S00355-021-01357-4zbMath1484.91309OpenAlexW3194127635MaRDI QIDQ2125094
Guoqiang Tian, Ziyang Shen, Zhen-Hua Jiao
Publication date: 13 April 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01357-4
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
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