The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01350-xzbMath1484.91195OpenAlexW3201991300MaRDI QIDQ2125108

Hirofumi Yamamura, Takehiko Yamato, Junyi Shen, Takuma Wakayama, Tatsuki Homma, Ryosuke Iba

Publication date: 13 April 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2018-23.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• Incentives in Teams
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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