A framework for the analysis of self-confirming policies

DOI10.1007/s11238-021-09862-9zbMath1484.91116OpenAlexW4210999108MaRDI QIDQ2125240

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 13 April 2022

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-021-09862-9

zbMATH Keywords

monetary policyself-confirming equilibriumpartial identification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

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• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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