A reputation game on cyber-security and cyber-risk calibration

DOI10.1007/s00245-022-09851-6OpenAlexW4225656912MaRDI QIDQ2128620

Jin Hyuk Choi, Kookyoung Han

Publication date: 22 April 2022

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.14571

zbMATH Keywords

optimal stoppingstochastic controlBayesian learningcyber-securityreputation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistics (62-XX) Biology and other natural sciences (92-XX)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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