Towards tight random probing security
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Publication:2128995
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_7zbMath1486.94083OpenAlexW3184500914MaRDI QIDQ2128995
Maximilian Orlt, Gaëtan Cassiers, Sebastian Faust, François-Xavier Standaert
Publication date: 22 April 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-84252-9_7
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