Competition and equilibrium effort choice

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104331zbMath1489.91088OpenAlexW4211121819MaRDI QIDQ2136938

Jing Xu

Publication date: 16 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104331

zbMATH Keywords

competitionNash equilibriumcostly effortrelative status concern

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Applications of game theory (91A80) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Related Items (1)

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Cites Work

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