Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332zbMath1489.91105OpenAlexW4211203241MaRDI QIDQ2136939

Abhimanyu Khan

Publication date: 16 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104332

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionexpected utilitybargainingcumulative prospect theoryreference-dependent preferenceloss-aversionprobability-weighting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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