Welfare implications of bank capital requirements under dynamic default decisions

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104360zbMath1489.91302OpenAlexW4221132954MaRDI QIDQ2136976

Toshiaki Ogawa

Publication date: 16 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104360

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous defaultoccasionally binding constraintsentry and exitbank capital requirementsheterogeneous bank model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50) Financial networks (including contagion, systemic risk, regulation) (91G45)

Cites Work

• Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
• Capital Buffers in a Quantitative Model of Banking Industry Dynamics
• Entry, Exit, and firm Dynamics in Long Run Equilibrium
• Reorganization or Liquidation: Bankruptcy Choice and Firm Dynamics
• Banks, Liquidity Management, and Monetary Policy

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