Principal-agent VCG contracts

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105443zbMath1490.91122OpenAlexW4220772785MaRDI QIDQ2138089

Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash

Publication date: 11 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105443

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agentVCGcontractible contractsgames played through agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Auctions of heterogeneous objects
• Robust competitive auctions
• Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• Definable and Contractible Contracts
• Intrinsic Robustness of the Price of Anarchy
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
• Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems
• The Price of Anarchy in Auctions
• Games Played Through Agents
• Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient
• Composable and efficient mechanisms
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions

This page was built for publication: Principal-agent VCG contracts