Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102625zbMath1490.91112OpenAlexW4200003244MaRDI QIDQ2138369

Jun Zhang, Jingsheng Yu

Publication date: 11 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102625

zbMATH Keywords

corehousing market modelrestricted endowment rightstop trading cycle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• On cores and indivisibility
• A market design approach to job rotation
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods

This page was built for publication: Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets