Trading probabilities along cycles
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Publication:2138374
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102631zbMath1490.91114OpenAlexW4206577191MaRDI QIDQ2138374
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102631
efficiencyindividual rationalitystrategy-proofnessprobabilistic assignmenttop trading cyclesno-envy in net trade
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