On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
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Publication:2138378
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102637zbMath1490.91107arXiv2004.09075OpenAlexW4206773407MaRDI QIDQ2138378
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2004.09075
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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