Reflexive analysis of equilibria in a triopoly game with linear cost functions of the agents

DOI10.1134/S0005117922030079zbMath1489.91144OpenAlexW4224131325MaRDI QIDQ2139498

M. I. Geras'kin

Publication date: 17 May 2022

Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117922030079

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumoligopolyStackelberg leaderreflexive gametelecommunications market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

The interaction of economic agents in Cournot duopoly models under ecological conditions: a comparison of organizational modes ⋮ A survey of the latest advances in oligopoly games ⋮ Convergence conditions for the dynamics of reflexive collective behavior in a Cournot oligopoly model under incomplete information

Cites Work

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• Reflexive dynamics in the Cournot oligopoly under uncertainty
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• Collective behavior in the Stackelberg model under incomplete information
• Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
• Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity
• Non-cooperative games
• Equilibria in the Stackelberg Oligopoly Reflexive Games with Different Marginal Costs of Agents

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