Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
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Publication:2140313
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2021.12.048OpenAlexW4205165321MaRDI QIDQ2140313
Publication date: 20 May 2022
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.12.048
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