Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-86593-1_1zbMath1497.91201arXiv1904.03890OpenAlexW3200900840MaRDI QIDQ2140473

Simon Mauras, Claire Mathieu, Hugo Gimbert

Publication date: 20 May 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.03890

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Matching models (91B68)

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