An epistemic characterization of MACA
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Publication:2143888
DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01341-0zbMath1492.91052OpenAlexW2187173843MaRDI QIDQ2143888
Publication date: 31 May 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01341-0
LPSbackward inductionrationalizabilityself-confirming equilibriumcommon beliefperfect equilibriummutual beliefMACA(perfect) rationality
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Cites Work
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