Coalitions with limited coordination

DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01302-zzbMath1492.91188OpenAlexW3070930534MaRDI QIDQ2143898

Leonidas C. Koutsougeras

Publication date: 31 May 2022

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01302-z

zbMATH Keywords

coremultiple proposalsincomplete coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

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• Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity
• The Core of an Economy with Transaction Costs
• A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy

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