Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
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Publication:2143904
DOI10.1007/s00199-020-01304-xzbMath1492.91132OpenAlexW3047651868MaRDI QIDQ2143904
Huiyi Guo, Nicholas C. Yannelis
Publication date: 31 May 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01304-x
Utility theory (91B16) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (4)
Special issue in honor of Nicholas C. Yannelis. II ⋮ Green closed-loop supply chain optimization strategy considering CER and incentive-compatibility theory under uncertainty ⋮ Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences ⋮ Robust leverage dynamics without commitment
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