The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference

DOI10.3934/MATH.2021132OpenAlexW3112579891MaRDI QIDQ2146599

Xin Jiang, Dongsheng Xu, Qingqing Liu

Publication date: 17 June 2022

Published in: AIMS Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/math.2021132

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelventure capitalfairness preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• Venture capital, staged financing and optimal funding policies under uncertainty
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Business cycles in the euro area defined with coincident economic indicators and predicted with leading economic indicators
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach *

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