Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
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Publication:2150659
DOI10.1007/s13235-021-00392-1zbMath1494.91082arXiv2003.07965OpenAlexW3174264982MaRDI QIDQ2150659
Farzaneh Farhadi, Demosthenis Teneketzis
Publication date: 30 June 2022
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.07965
Related Items (2)
Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials ⋮ On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals
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