An evolutionary game model between governments and manufacturers considering carbon taxes, subsidies, and consumers' low-carbon preference

DOI10.1007/S13235-021-00390-3zbMath1494.91107OpenAlexW3166145529MaRDI QIDQ2150662

Shu-Wen Wang, Zhi-Hua Hu

Publication date: 30 June 2022

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00390-3

zbMATH Keywords

supply chain managementevolutionary gamecarbon taxsubsidyconsumers' low-carbon preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

The environmental responsibility of firms and insurance coverage in an evolutionary game ⋮ Plants' competition under autotoxicity effect: an evolutionary game ⋮ Government intervention in a recycling supply chain system: a strategy to make sustainable and clean environment

Cites Work

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• A cost-effectiveness differential game model for climate agreements
• State- and control-dependent incentives in a closed-loop supply chain with dynamic returns
• Nurturing an infant industry by Markovian subsidy schemes
• Climate engineering in an interconnected world: the role of tariffs
• Study of game models and the complex dynamics of a low-carbon supply chain with an altruistic retailer under consumers' low-carbon preference
• A study on supply chain emission reduction level based on carbon tax and consumers' low-carbon preferences under stochastic demand
• State-policy dynamics in evolutionary games
• Evolutionary Games in Economics

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