On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
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Publication:2150676
DOI10.1007/s13235-021-00388-xzbMath1494.91034arXiv1909.13720OpenAlexW3157644172MaRDI QIDQ2150676
Publication date: 30 June 2022
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.13720
Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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