Implicit power indices for measuring indirect control in corporate structures

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-64563-5_4zbMath1503.91157OpenAlexW4205799233MaRDI QIDQ2151324

Izabella Stach, Linus Olsson, Jochen Staudacher

Publication date: 1 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-64563-5_4

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative game theorypower indicescorporate shareholding structuresdirect and indirect control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic programming for computing power indices for weighted voting games with precoalitions

Uses Software

• R
• igraph
• Rcpp
• CoopGame

Cites Work

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