Bayesian persuasion in sequential trials

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_2OpenAlexW4205889852MaRDI QIDQ2152099

Vijay G. Subramanian, Grant Schoenebeck, Shih-Tang Su

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.09594

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesBayesian persuasioninformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences
• Long persuasion games
• Dynamic persuasion
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?
• Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure
• Persuasion with limited communication capacity
• Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
• Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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