Welfare-preserving \(\varepsilon \)-BIC to BIC transformation with negligible revenue loss

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_5OpenAlexW4226052454MaRDI QIDQ2152105

Eric Sodomka, David C. Parkes, Zhe Feng, Vincent Conitzer

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.09579

zbMATH Keywords

automated mechanism designapproximately IC mechanismBIC transformation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

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