Strategyproof facility location in perturbation stable instances

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_6OpenAlexW4225854436MaRDI QIDQ2152106

Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.11977

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

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