Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_8OpenAlexW4205256144MaRDI QIDQ2152109

Zihe Wang, Pinyan Lu, Ioannis Caragiannis, N. V. Gravin

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_8

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbipartite matchingrevenue maximizationprophet inequalityposted pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

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• Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
• Correlation-Robust Analysis of Single Item Auction
• Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory

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