Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
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Publication:2152111
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_9OpenAlexW3201343093MaRDI QIDQ2152111
Philip Lazos, Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi
Publication date: 6 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.08644
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
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Cites Work
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