Threshold tests as quality signals: optimal strategies, equilibria, and Price of anarchy

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_17OpenAlexW4225897285MaRDI QIDQ2152123

Siddhartha Banerjee, David Kempe, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2110.10881

zbMATH Keywords

signalinginformation elicitationPrice of anarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Cites Work

• Competitive cheap talk
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
• Sequential decisions with tests
• Limited capacity in project selection: competition through evidence production
• Competitive disclosure of correlated information
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory

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