Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations
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Publication:2152132
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_21OpenAlexW4225771455MaRDI QIDQ2152132
Paritosh Verma, Siddharth Barman
Publication date: 6 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.02656
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
Related Items (2)
Improved maximin guarantees for subadditive and fractionally subadditive fair allocation problem ⋮ Weighted fair division with matroid-rank valuations: monotonicity and strategyproofness
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