Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_29OpenAlexW4226126785MaRDI QIDQ2152144

Ioannis Caragiannis, Stavros D. Ioannidis

Publication date: 6 July 2022

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.02789

zbMATH Keywords

fair divisionapproximation algorithmsindivisible goodssubsidy minimization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)

Related Items (2)

Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing ⋮ Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions

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