Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies
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Publication:2152144
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_29OpenAlexW4226126785MaRDI QIDQ2152144
Ioannis Caragiannis, Stavros D. Ioannidis
Publication date: 6 July 2022
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.02789
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
Related Items (2)
Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing ⋮ Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions
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