A penalty function method for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard
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Publication:2154354
DOI10.1007/s10473-021-0521-6OpenAlexW3175446596MaRDI QIDQ2154354
Publication date: 19 July 2022
Published in: Acta Mathematica Scientia. Series B. (English Edition) (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10473-021-0521-6
moral hazardmechanism designpenalty function methodprincipal-agent problemsemi-infinite programming problem
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