Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2022.03.008zbMath1497.91054OpenAlexW4226293670MaRDI QIDQ2155880

Francesc Dilmé

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.008

zbMATH Keywords

strategic communicationsmall bias

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (2)

Communication between unbiased agents ⋮ Incomplete contracts versus communication

Cites Work

• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Pure communication between agents with close preferences.
• Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• Confidence and competence in communication
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• A First Course in the Numerical Analysis of Differential Equations
• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• Optimal Delegation

This page was built for publication: Strategic communication with a small conflict of interest