A two-population game in observable double-ended queuing systems

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2022.05.004OpenAlexW4281845356MaRDI QIDQ2157919

Tuan Phung-Duc, Hung Q. Nguyen

Publication date: 22 July 2022

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2022.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryNash equilibriumsubgame perfect Nash equilibriumstrategic queuingtwo-population game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Related Items (1)

Stationary analyses for a double-ended queueing system with random service capacity and balking customers

Cites Work

• Optimization and strategic behavior in a passenger-taxi service system
• To queue or not to queue: equilibrium behavior in queueing systems.
• Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection in observable queues
• Rational Queueing
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls

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