On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences

DOI10.1007/s10479-020-03591-yzbMath1497.91105OpenAlexW3014785077MaRDI QIDQ2158613

Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Hatem Smaoui, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date: 26 July 2022

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03591-y

zbMATH Keywords

probabilityscoring rulesapproval votingthree-valued scalevoting by evaluation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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