Impossibility of weakly stable and strategy-proof mechanism

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2022.110675zbMath1494.91098OpenAlexW4283074477WikidataQ113875765 ScholiaQ113875765MaRDI QIDQ2159837

Pinaki Mandal, Sung Ho Cho, Makoto Yokoo, Miyuki Koshimura, Kentaro Yahiro

Publication date: 2 August 2022

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110675

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessweak stabilitytwo-sided matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (2)

Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation ⋮ Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching

Cites Work

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• Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
• Controlled School Choice with Soft Bounds and Overlapping Types
• Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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