The cry wolf effect in evacuation: a game-theoretic approach
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Publication:2160064
DOI10.1016/j.physa.2019.04.126OpenAlexW2925429839WikidataQ128084347 ScholiaQ128084347MaRDI QIDQ2160064
Enrico Ronchi, Erik Mohlin, Alexandros Rigos
Publication date: 2 August 2022
Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.01963
Cites Work
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- GAME THEORETIC BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR EVACUEES' EXIT SELECTION
- Sequential Equilibria
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