Prejudice, privilege, and power: conflicts and cooperation between recognizable groups

DOI10.3934/mbe.2019203zbMath1497.91035OpenAlexW2944065109WikidataQ93200357 ScholiaQ93200357MaRDI QIDQ2160764

Cang Hui, Pietro Landi, Jeremy Bingham

Publication date: 3 August 2022

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/mbe.2019203

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryprisoner's dilemmastag hunttagsmathematical sociologyde-segregation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social and behavioral sciences: general topics (91C99) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• The Evolution of Cooperation
• Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
• Ecological and Evolutionary Modelling
• Modelling coevolution in ecological networks with adaptive dynamics
• The social diversification of fashion

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