Incentive mechanism design for security investment with local exit equilibrium on structured populations

DOI10.1016/j.physa.2019.121801OpenAlexW2952521631MaRDI QIDQ2162588

Xiangbin Zhu, Zhaolong Hu, Jiaying Zhao

Publication date: 8 August 2022

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2019.121801

zbMATH Keywords

incentive mechanismpublic goods gameinterdependent securityexit equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Related Items (1)

Evolutionary dynamics of the interdependent security games on complex network

Cites Work

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• Game Theory and Mechanism Design

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