Stochastic stability analysis of evolutionary two-player games on regular graphs

DOI10.1016/j.physa.2019.122364OpenAlexW2967673186WikidataQ127392104 ScholiaQ127392104MaRDI QIDQ2164083

Xin-Jian Xu, Haili Liang, Zhao Zhou, Housheng Su, Wen-Li Du

Publication date: 12 August 2022

Published in: Physica A (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.physa.2019.122364

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic stabilityregular graphsprisoner's dilemma gamesevolutionary gamessnowdrift games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Statistical mechanics, structure of matter (82-XX)

Related Items (1)

Almost sure exponential stability of two-strategy evolutionary games with multiplicative noise

Cites Work

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