Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102714OpenAlexW4280646644MaRDI QIDQ2164330

Takashi Kunimoto, Cuiling Zhang

Publication date: 12 August 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102714

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationbilateral tradestwo-stage mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

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