On convexity in cooperative games with externalities
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2168546
DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01371-8zbMath1498.91018OpenAlexW3167286505MaRDI QIDQ2168546
José M. Alonso-Meijide, M. Álvarez-Mozos, Andrés Jiménez-Losada, María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
Publication date: 31 August 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01371-8
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Externalities, potential, value and consistency
- Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
- Sharing a river among satiable agents
- A recursive core for partition function form games
- Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities
- The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure
- The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Sharing a river.
- Capital accumulation game with quasi-geometric discounting and consumption externalities
- Revisiting the Coase theorem
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities
- Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
- Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
- Cores of convex games
- How Can Cooperative Game Theory Be Made More Relevant to Economics? : An Open Problem
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value
- N‐person games in partition function form
