Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
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Publication:2168548
DOI10.1007/s00199-021-01376-3zbMath1498.91279OpenAlexW3180867189MaRDI QIDQ2168548
Publication date: 31 August 2022
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01376-3
information acquisitionschool choiceinformation provisiondeferred acceptance mechanismBoston immediate acceptance mechanism
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Cites Work
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