Controlling weighted voting games by deleting or adding players with or without changing the quota

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-06678-8_26OpenAlexW4285109974MaRDI QIDQ2169970

Jörg Rothe, Joanna Kaczmarek

Publication date: 30 August 2022

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-06678-8_26

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithms in computer science (68Wxx) Discrete mathematics in relation to computer science (68Rxx)

Cites Work

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