Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games

DOI10.3934/jdg.2022012zbMath1498.91062OpenAlexW4285269193MaRDI QIDQ2171246

Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju

Publication date: 23 September 2022

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2022012

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsmonomorphismsasymmetric evolutionary gamesneighborhood superioritygames with continuous strategy spacesneighborhood attractingpolymorphic profilesstrong uninvadable profiles

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Nonlinear ordinary differential equations and systems (34A34) Nonlinear differential equations in abstract spaces (34G20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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