How auctioneers set reserve prices in procurement auctions

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2022.04.025OpenAlexW4224309065MaRDI QIDQ2171616

Lijia Tan, Jason M. Shachat

Publication date: 9 September 2022

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.025

zbMATH Keywords

auctions/biddingbehavioural ORex-ante reserve priceex-post reserve price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

• Structural vs. atheoretic approaches to econometrics
• Just who are you calling risk averse?
• Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders
• How bidder's number affects optimal reserve price in first-price auctions under risk aversion
• The beauty of Dutch: bidding behavior in combinatorial first-price procurement auctions
• The beauty of Dutch: ex-post split-award auctions in procurement markets with diseconomies of scale
• Do Auctioneers Pick Optimal Reserve Prices?
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• The Probability Weighting Function
• Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions

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