A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget

DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01386-zzbMath1498.91216arXiv2002.02966OpenAlexW3005127104MaRDI QIDQ2171847

Rodrigo A. Velez

Publication date: 9 September 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.02966

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Equitable rent division on a soft budget

Cites Work

• Are incentives against economic justice?
• Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
• Divide and compromise
• A derivation of the money rawlsian solution
• Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability
• Which Is the Fairest (Rent Division) of Them All?
• Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes for Fair Rent Division

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